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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2011 marked the birth of a new idea. The United States
Supreme Court decided Staub v. Proctor Hospital and for the first
time invoked common law proximate cause in the context of federal
employment discrimination law.1 It is rare in jurisprudence to be pre-
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sent at the birth of an idea and then see that idea develop over its first
decade. This Article charts the emerging proximate cause doctrine
from its early days as a baby doctrine. Now, the doctrine is pre-adoles-
cent, with all of the changes and turmoil that phase entails.
Charting the first decade of this new doctrine is important because
factual cause doctrine is a central battleground of discrimination ju-
risprudence. In a string of cases starting in 2009, the Supreme Court
tightened the factual cause standard for some discrimination and re-
taliation claims.2 The majority opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County
relied heavily on a factual cause analysis when deciding that Title VII
prohibits discrimination because of sexual orientation and gender
identity.3 When the Supreme Court first invoked proximate (legal)
cause in 2011, it was unclear how proximate cause jurisprudence
would develop in discrimination cases and whether proximate cause
would become a prominent element in discrimination cases. This Arti-
cle reviews all of the discrimination cases invoking proximate cause
over the last decade and exposes the chaotic, emerging statutory prox-
imate cause doctrine.
This emerging proximate cause doctrine has several important fea-
tures. First, courts have not settled on a fixed meaning for proximate
cause in discrimination cases. Some judges appear to invoke the words
“proximate cause” as a general reference to causation without any spe-
cific legal meaning.4 Other judges appear to confuse the concept of
proximate cause with the separate concept of factual cause. Fre-
quently, federal judges recite that proximate cause requires a plaintiff
to prove that a supervisor’s animus was the motivating factor in Title
VII discrimination cases or was the “but for” cause in Title VII retalia-
tion or Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) cases.5 Still,
other cases appear to recognize proximate cause as a separate element
that must be proven in a discrimination case.6
Second, when courts apply the concept of “proximate cause” in em-
ployment discrimination doctrine, the results are inconsistent. Cases
with very similar facts often have different outcomes. Strangely, the
jurist who introduced the phrase “cat’s paw” into discrimination juris-
2. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013); Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009); see also Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of
African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020) (plaintiff must establish “but
for” cause to prevail on Section 1981 claim). However in Babb v. Wilkie, the Court
held that the federal sector ADEA discrimination provision prohibits any discrim-
ination based on age while also holding that remedies may be limited if the age
discrimination did not ultimately cause a negative outcome. 140 S. Ct. 1168
(2020).
3. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
4. See infra section V.A.
5. See infra section V.B.
6. See infra section V.C.
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prudence later apologized for doing so and predicted future chaos in
proximate cause doctrine. Judge Posner called the cat’s paw concept a
“judicial attractive nuisance.”7 He also lamented how confused the
courts were likely to be when applying proximate cause in cat’s paw
analysis. He noted that while proximate cause “has been a part of the
judicial vocabulary for the last 150 years, . . . its meaning has never
become clear.”8 He also lamented that “philosophical conundra such
as ‘causation’ present unnecessary challenges to understanding” how
discrimination happens.9
Most importantly, the discrimination proximate cause doctrine is
unmoored from both tort law and the discrimination statutes. It ap-
pears that tort law played almost no role in employment discrimina-
tion proximate cause jurisprudence over the past decade. Nor do the
courts explicitly rely on the text or policies of the discrimination stat-
utes when crafting proximate cause doctrine.
Given the unprincipled nature of the emerging proximate cause
doctrine and its inconsistency, courts should jettison the concept of
proximate cause from discrimination law. However, in doing so, they
should retain a central insight from Staub. Strangely, Staub’s use of
proximate cause has caused the courts to more fully interrogate the
role of factual cause in discrimination. While courts should abolish
proximate cause in this context, they should retain the core of Staub:
the idea that plaintiffs can establish discrimination when a decision is
improperly tainted by a protected trait.
Part II of this Article begins by grounding readers in the tort con-
cepts of factual cause and proximate (or legal) cause. Part III exam-
ines the language of the federal discrimination statutes and how
courts molded factual cause doctrines under those statutes. Part IV
explores the Supreme Court opinion in Staub in depth, highlighting
how the case created the current chaos in proximate cause jurispru-
dence. Part V summarizes a decade of case law relating to proximate
cause, showing how appellate and trial courts do not define it in the
same way; some courts see it as a general causation principle, others
view it as synonymous with factual cause, and still others indicate
there is a separate proximate cause doctrine. It also discusses how
courts inconsistently apply proximate cause to similar fact scenarios.
Part VI demonstrates that tort proximate cause is performing almost
no work in the jurisprudence. Nor do courts rely on the text or policies
of the discrimination statutes in developing the doctrine. Despite all of
these problems, Part VII argues that courts’ struggle with the proxi-
mate cause concept over the past decade has helped them to under-
7. Cook v. IPC Int’l Corp., 673 F.3d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 2012).
8. Id.
9. Id.
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stand factual cause more deeply. While jettisoning proximate cause,
courts should retain the central insights about factual cause.
II. CAUSATION GENERALLY
Common law proximate cause includes two different kinds of is-
sues: cause in fact and legal or proximate cause.10 “Conduct is a fac-
tual cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred absent the
conduct.”11 Even if a party is the factual cause of harm, that party
may ultimately not be liable for the harm caused because proximate
cause principles may limit liability.
Proximate cause does not have one fixed meaning.12 Instead, it is
an umbrella term that can encapsulate many different concepts, in-
cluding when intervening actions will cut off liability,13 whether a tort
victim is foreseeable,14 the scope of risk of the defendant’s actions,15
and policy concerns.16 In some iterations, courts do not express a spe-
10. The distinction between these two concepts is often blurred. See Jane Stapleton,
Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 941, 945 (2001). I have discussed common law proximate cause issues in
greater depth in previous articles. See Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA.
L. REV. 1051, 1052–54 (2014) [hereinafter Sperino, The Tort Label]; Sandra F.
Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 31 (2013) [hereinafter Sperino, Discrimination Statutes].
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). It should be noted that the “but for” cause model does
not work in certain factual scenarios, such as multiple sufficient cause cases, and
courts often modify factual cause standards to deal with these scenarios.
12. See Proximate Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (providing multi-
ple definitions for proximate cause and indicating that the following terms also
reflect proximate cause: direct cause, efficient cause, legal cause, procuring cause,
and remote cause, among others); Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negli-
gence Law: History, Theory, and the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 51
(1991). Further, the definition of proximate cause has changed over time. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29.
13. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
917, 970 (2010). The term “superseding cause” is often used to refer to an inter-
vening force that is sufficient to cut off liability from the original tortfeasor. RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 34 cmt. b.
14. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dis-
senting); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. j (discussing Palsgraf
and the multiple versions of proximate cause it articulates).
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 (“An actor’s liability is limited to those
harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”).
16. The Restatement has recently started using the words “scope of liability” to refer
to proximate cause and has also focused the inquiry on the scope of risk. RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29. Using Restatement sections applicable to physical
harm cases may not be appropriate in statutes where the harms are emotional or
economic in nature. Reference to these sections is only meant to explain the possi-
ble scope of proximate cause. Early common law cases used a direct test for proxi-
mate cause. Kelley, supra note 12, at 52. But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
§ 29 cmt. b (“[C]onduct need not be close in space or time to the plaintiff’s harm to
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cific goal for proximate cause; instead, they describe it generally as
being concerned with line drawing, determining when, as a matter of
policy, defendants should not be liable even though their actions
caused the injury in question.17 In discussing proximate cause, lead-
ing torts commentators indicate that “[t]here is perhaps nothing in the
entire field of law which has called forth more disagreement, or upon
which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion.”18
Within the past decade, the Supreme Court has applied proximate
cause doctrine in a number of statutory contexts.19 The most consis-
tent principle to be derived from these cases is that the Supreme
Court’s proximate cause doctrine lacks consistency. In case after case,
the Court chooses among varying iterations of proximate cause with-
out explicitly referencing a decision-making process. However, the
version of proximate cause the Justices select is particularly impor-
tant in statutory cases because some of the iterations will allow claims
to proceed and others will not.
In Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, the Court explicitly
rejected a proximate cause test based solely on foreseeability.20 How-
ever, the Court also declined to define proximate cause in detail, not-
ing that it is tied to the goals of the underlying statute, requires a
sufficiently close connection between the conduct prohibited by the
statute and the alleged injury, and looks at what is administratively
possible and convenient.21 At other times, the Court has listed fore-
be a proximate cause.”). Some courts still rely on arguments about directness
when discussing proximate cause. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564
U.S. 685, 707 (2011) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
17. See Stapleton, supra note 10, at 985–86 (listing the following concerns that might
be involved in proximate cause line drawing: “(1) the perceived purpose of the
recognition of a pocket of obligation in the circumstances; (2) the costs of legal
rules and their administration; (3) the dignity of the law; (4) the interest in indi-
vidual freedom; (5) the recklessness or intention to harm, if any, of the defendant;
(6) the relative wrongfulness of different actors; (7) the concern that the extent of
liability not be wholly out of proportion to the degree of wrongfulness; (8) the fact
that the defendant was acting in pursuit of commercial profit; and (9) whether
allowance of recovery for such consequences would be likely to open the way to
fraudulent claims” (footnotes omitted)).
18. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 263 (5th ed. 1984).
19. See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (discussing proximate cause in
context of Clayton Act); Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1842
(2018) (discussing proximate cause in context of National Voter Registration Act);
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) (dis-
cussing proximate cause in context of Lanham Act); see also Utah v. Strieff, 136
S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016) (using intervening cause in Fourth Amendment context).
20. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1305 (2017).
21. Id.
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seeability as a primary touchstone of proximate cause.22 The Court
noted, “A requirement of proximate cause thus serves, inter alia, to
preclude liability in situations where the causal link between conduct
and result is so attenuated that the consequence is more aptly de-
scribed as mere fortuity.”23
In 2011, five members of the Supreme Court embraced an ambigu-
ous test for proximate cause.24 The Court defined proximate cause as
“shorthand for a concept: Injuries have countless causes, and not all
should give rise to legal liability.”25 It quoted the dissent in Palsgraf v.
Long Island Railroad Co., which noted that “because of convenience,
of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines
to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.”26 The Court also
noted how proximate cause includes multiple concepts such as “the
‘immediate’ or ‘nearest’ antecedent test; the ‘efficient, producing cause’
test; the ‘substantial factor’ test; and the ‘probable’, or ‘natural and
probable’, or ‘foreseeable’ consequence test.”27
At other times, members of the Court have articulated a much nar-
rower view of the doctrine. For example, in Apple Inc. v. Pepper, four
of the Justices agreed that proximate cause doctrine is about barring
suits for injuries that are “derivative of misfortunes visited upon a
third person by the defendant’s acts.”28 These Justices would not fol-
low injury beyond the first harmed party. A proximate cause doctrine
that looks at the first harmed party may lead to different outcomes
than other proximate cause iterations.
The Supreme Court has also used proximate cause to mean factual
cause. In Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, the Court indicated
that when statutes contain causal language, the Court must deter-
mine whether that language denotes sole cause, “but for” cause, or
proximate cause.29 In another case, the Supreme Court indicated
22. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 445 (2014) (“Proximate cause is often
explicated in terms of foreseeability or the scope of the risk created by the predi-
cate conduct.”).
23. Id.
24. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 692 (2011).
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (An-
drews, J., dissenting)).
27. Id. at 701 (citations omitted).
28. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1527 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 133
(2014)).
29. Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1842 (2018). It should be
noted that the Supreme Court is trying to create a canon of construction that
imports common law causation into statutes. This is a fairly recent move by the
Court. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009); see also Com-
cast v. Nat’l Ass’n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S Ct. 1009 (2020) (plaintiff
must establish “but for” cause to prevail on Section 1981 claim).
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proximate cause embraced both factual cause and legal cause.30 How-
ever, in a third case, the Court described factual cause and proximate
cause as two separate doctrines.31
In other cases, the Supreme Court has defined proximate cause in
different ways. For example, the Court has described proximate cause
as a label for “the judicial tools used to limit a person’s responsibility
for the consequences of that person’s own acts.”32 It also has noted
that proximate cause relates to concerns about “what is administra-
tively possible and convenient.”33
These cases demonstrate that the Justices cannot agree on what
exactly proximate cause is designed to accomplish.34 This problem is
inherent in proximate cause jurisprudence generally, not just with
cases that make it to the Supreme Court.35
At times, members of the Supreme Court have been forthright
about the lack of inherent meaning. Chief Justice Roberts has sug-
gested that proximate cause is not intended to be captured in one uni-
form test, but instead, “furnish[es] illustrations of situations which
judicious men upon careful consideration have adjudged to be on one
side of the line or the other.”36 Justice Scalia has noted that proximate
cause is a necessary concept, even if it is “an imperfect legal doctrine”
whose tenets are not “easy to describe or straightforward to apply.”37
Nor has the concept of proximate cause remained fixed over time.38
Older articulations of proximate cause often focused on whether the
cause at issue was the nearest in time or space to the claimed harm.39
The Restatement (First) of Torts embraced an idea of legal cause that
included concepts from factual cause and proximate cause analysis,
30. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 444 (2014) (“To say one event proxi-
mately caused another means, first, that the former event caused the latter, i.e.,
actual cause or cause in fact; and second, that it is a proximate cause, i.e., it has a
sufficient connection to the result.”).
31. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210 (2014).
32. Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).
33. Id. (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 264).
34. For another description of proximate cause, see Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.,
547 U.S. 451, 469–70 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
35. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). Indeed, even in
Palsgraf, Justice Cardozo addressed concerns about causation as it relates to
duty. Id. at 99–100; see also Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence
Law, 28 TEX. L. REV. 471, 471–72 (1950) (discussing courts’ uses of the proximate
cause doctrine).
36. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 719 (2011) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(quoting Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 839 (1996)).
37. Pac. Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 565 U.S. 207, 224 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part).
38. KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 276–79 (discussing various tests).
39. Id. at 276.
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while the Restatement (Third) of Torts separates factual and proxi-
mate cause.40
Proximate cause has underpinnings and goals that are both con-
tested and ever-evolving. Courts also apply it differently depending on
the tort at issue. In intentional tort cases, proximate cause may play
less of a role in cutting off liability. When an actor intentionally causes
harm, the actor is liable, even if the harm was unlikely to occur; fur-
thermore, intentional actors are liable for a broader range of harms
than negligent actors.41 In deciding the scope of liability, the Restate-
ment (Third) notes that the following play important roles in the anal-
ysis: “[T]he moral culpability of the actor, . . . the seriousness of harm
intended and threatened by those acts, and the degree to which the
actor’s conduct deviated from appropriate care.”42 In intentional tort
cases, “the defendant’s wrongful conduct is [usually] closely linked—
temporally and conceptually—to the plaintiff’s harm.”43 Intentional
tort cases do not typically involve multiple causes.44 When proximate
cause is relevant in intentional tort cases, proximate cause analysis
will likely cut off liability for the defendant in fewer circumstances
than it would when applied to negligence.45 Importantly, the underly-
ing tort affects the robustness of proximate cause.
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE § 430
(AM. LAW INST. 1934) (indicating that to establish legal cause the plaintiff must
be in the class of persons to which the defendant’s actions create a risk of causing
harm); Id. § 431 (defining legal cause as being a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm, without an exception to relieve the defendant of responsibility);
Id. § 433 (defining legal cause with concepts such as whether there was a contin-
uous force or series of forces and whether the harm was highly extraordinary
given the defendant’s conduct).
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 33. Some question whether traditional notions
of proximate cause have a similarly diminished role in non-traditional common
law tort cases. See, e.g., Stapleton, supra note 10, at 946.
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 33. The Restatement view is even more
nuanced, noting that where intent is established by showing the defendant was
substantially certain the harm would occur, proximate cause should not be as
narrow as it is with other intent cases. Id. § 33 cmt. d.
43. Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94
IOWA L. REV. 811, 832 (2009).
44. Id.
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 33 (“An actor who intentionally or recklessly
causes harm is subject to liability for a broader range of harms than the harms
for which that actor would be liable if only acting negligently.”); id. § 33 cmt. a
(noting that its scope of risk standard is inadequate with respect to intentional
torts); see also 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 421 (2020) (noting that proximate
cause applies in strict liability). But see Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig,
Parens Patriae Litigation to Redress Societal Damages from the BP Oil Spill: The
Latest Stage in the Evolution of Crimtorts, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 68
(2011) (asserting that courts do not typically apply proximate cause to strict
liability).
2020] STATUTORY PROXIMATE CAUSE DOCTRINE 293
III. FACTUAL CAUSATION IN DISCRIMINATION LAW
Before discussing proximate cause in discrimination statutes, it is
important to first consider factual cause. Since the early 1970s, the
Supreme Court has been engaged in a decades-long battle about cau-
sation in discrimination law. The factual causation question centers
on two issues: the substantive standard for establishing causation
(motivating factor versus “but for” cause) and the party required to
establish causation.46
Importantly, throughout this decades-long discussion about causa-
tion, the Supreme Court never invoked the separate idea of proximate
cause until 2011.47 And, as discussed in Parts IV and V below, it is
unclear when the Court invokes proximate cause whether it is dis-
cussing proximate cause as a separate concept or conflating proximate
and factual cause.
Federal employment discrimination law is centered on three stat-
utes: Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).48 Causation plays a
central role in discrimination law. Under the federal discrimination
statutes, an employer may not take certain actions “because of” an
individual’s protected trait, such as race, sex, or age.49
Title VII is the cornerstone federal employment discrimination
statute. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against a
worker “because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”50
Title VII’s main operative provision consists of two subparts. Under
the first subpart, it is an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]”51
Under Title VII’s second subpart, it is unlawful for an employer to “to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
46. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (discussing both
the required substantive standard and which party has the burden of establish-
ing it).
47. But see id. at 282 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (in one sentence noting that the law
generally might require a party to establish “but for” cause and also proximate
cause).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2018) (Title VII’s primary operative provisions); 29
U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018) (same for ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b) (2018) (same for
ADA). Race discrimination claims can also be pursued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(2018). Comcast v. Nat’l Ass’n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009
(2020) (plaintiff must establish “but for” cause to prevail on Section 1981 claim).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a).
51. Id. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
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ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin.”52 These two subparts form the foundation
of Title VII’s text.53 The ADEA contains similar main language,54 and
the ADA contains similar concepts, although not always stated in the
same language.55
The early Title VII disparate treatment cases were often based on
employer decisions that were explicitly race- or sex-based decisions.56
For example, an employer might reserve certain jobs for white em-
ployees or for men. Claims related to these facially discriminatory pol-
icies later became grouped into a type of individual disparate
treatment case referred to as a direct evidence case.57 The courts
tended to use simple formulations in evaluating direct evidence cases,
essentially requiring a plaintiff to establish that a decision was taken
because of a protected trait.58 As the policies explicitly invoked race or
52. Id. § 2000e–2(a)(2).
53. Congress amended Title VII in 1991. However, this does not change the fact that
the foundational text of Title VII is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2018).
56. See, e.g., Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 368, 374 (E.D. La. 1968) (alleging
that employer engaged in discrimination by only hiring union members when
union itself engaged in discriminatory membership practices); Weeks v. S. Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 277 F. Supp. 117, 117–18 (S.D. Ga. 1967) (alleging that employer
had a policy of making gender a qualification for a switchman position), rev’d, 408
F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781, 781
(E.D. La. 1967) (alleging discrimination based on company policy that required
women to resign upon marriage).
57. See, e.g., Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1137 (10th Cir. 2000) (indicat-
ing that a company policy of discrimination constitutes direct evidence). Outside
of the context of facially discriminatory policies, courts have had a difficult time
defining direct evidence, and definitions regarding what constitutes direct evi-
dence vary. While the definitions of these terms appear to vary slightly by circuit,
direct evidence of discrimination can be described as “evidence, that, if believed,
proves the existence of a fact in issue without inference or presumption . . . [and]
is composed of only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing
other than to discriminate on the basis of some impermissible factor.” Rojas v.
Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (quoting Schoen-
feld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 1999)). One court has described
direct evidence as that which “essentially requires an admission by the employer”
and explained that “such evidence ‘is rare.’” Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539
F.3d 724, 733 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Benders v. Bellows & Bellows, 515 F.3d
757, 764 (7th Cir. 2008)). “A statement that can plausibly be interpreted two dif-
ferent ways—one discriminatory and the other benign—does not directly reflect
illegal animus, and, thus, does not constitute direct evidence.” Vaughn v. Ep-
worth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 1154–55 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hall v. U.S. Dep’t
of Labor, 476 F.3d 847, 855 (10th Cir. 2007)).
58. See. e.g., Mach v. Will Cty. Sheriff, 580 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 2009); Paz v.
Wauconda Healthcare and Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 464 F.3d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 2006)
(noting that under the direct method of proving discrimination the court should
not use a burden-shifting framework).
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sex and often explicitly linked those traits with an outcome, there was
little need for the courts to define exactly the required causal standard
and which party was required to prove it.
However, as these explicit policies and decisions became less com-
mon, the courts began to consider the minimal level of evidence that a
plaintiff would be required to produce to proceed with a discrimination
claim. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court cre-
ated a three-part, burden-shifting test for analyzing individual dispa-
rate treatment cases.59 The central insight from McDonnell Douglas is
that a plaintiff can establish discrimination by showing that an em-
ployer’s articulated reason for its action was a pretext for discrimina-
tion.60 In other words, an employee is not required to produce
“smoking gun” evidence to prove discrimination. Instead, a plaintiff
might be able to prevail if the employer’s reasons for its action do not
make sense, are not credible, or otherwise seem fishy. Although not
explicitly stated in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, the underly-
ing concern in the line of cases is essentially one of causation—
whether the plaintiff has enough evidence to establish that an em-
ployer made a decision because of a protected trait. Noticeably, the
McDonnell-Douglas test does not rely heavily on common law notions
of factual cause.
McDonnell Douglas did not address the causation question in a
context where both legitimate and discriminatory factors might be at
work. In the 1989 case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court ad-
dressed a case in which legitimate and discriminatory factors may
have played a role in the employer’s decision not to promote a woman
to partner.61 The Court held that a plaintiff must establish that a pro-
tected trait was a motivating factor in the employment decision.62 If
the plaintiff does this, the employer has the ability to avoid liability by
proving an affirmative defense—that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not allowed the protected trait to play a role.63
59. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Some circuits will allow
a plaintiff to make a case of discrimination without resorting to McDonnell Doug-
las if the plaintiff has “either direct or circumstantial evidence that supports an
inference of intentional discrimination.” Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578
F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2009).
60. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. The Court noted that the facts required to
prove a prima facie case will necessarily vary depending on the case. Id. at 802
n.13. In subsequent cases, the Court further considered how the McDonnell-
Douglas test would operate. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 507 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
61. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244–45 (1989). For a description of
how the decision’s language was imported from constitutional claims, see Cathe-
rine T. Struve, Shifting Burdens: Discrimination Law Through the Lens of Jury
Instructions, 51 B.C. L. REV. 279, 320–21 (2010).
62. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244–45.
63. Id.
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Price Waterhouse has a plurality opinion, two concurrences, and a
dissent. Given this structure, it is often difficult for courts and com-
mentators to see the hidden majority views within it. The plurality
explicitly rejected the idea that Title VII requires a plaintiff to estab-
lish “but for” cause.64 It noted:
It is difficult for us to imagine that, in the simple words “because of,” Congress
meant to obligate a plaintiff to identify the precise causal role played by legiti-
mate and illegitimate motivations in the employment decision she challenges.
We conclude, instead, that Congress meant to obligate her to prove that the
employer relied upon sex-based considerations in coming to its decision.65
There were two main issues in Price Waterhouse: the substantive
causal standard and which party must prove it. The Court held it was
not appropriate to require the plaintiff to carry the entire causal bur-
den.66 Instead, the plaintiff could prevail after showing her protected
trait was a motivating factor. “But for” cause is still part of the in-
quiry, however, because the employer can prevail by showing that it
would have taken the negative action even if the protected trait was
absent. A majority of the Court agreed with these main ideas.67
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to change the structure enun-
ciated in Price Waterhouse.68 Congress indicated that a plaintiff could
prevail on a discrimination claim under Title VII by establishing that
a protected trait played a motivating factor in an employment deci-
sion.69 Congress also created an affirmative defense which, if proven,
would be a partial defense to damages.70 This affirmative defense
made Title VII more plaintiff friendly than Price Waterhouse. Under
Price Waterhouse, if the employer proved that it would have made the
same decision absent the protected trait, the employer was not liable
for discrimination. After the 1991 amendments to Title VII, an em-
ployer who prevailed on the affirmative defense would be held liable
for discrimination, but the amendments limited the type of damages
that could be awarded to the plaintiff.
Unfortunately, the statutory language did not explain how this
new “motivating factor” language fit in with the existing frameworks
for evaluating discrimination cases. Additionally, when Congress ad-
64. Id. at 240.
65. Id. at 241–42.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 259–60 (White, J., concurring) (stating in addition that a “semantic discus-
sion” about “but for” causation was not necessary to understand the substantial
factor issue); id. at 265–66 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The main disagreement
between Justice O’Connor and the plurality was whether the plaintiff must pre-
sent direct evidence to use the proof structure.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2018).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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ded the motivating factor language to Title VII, it did not make simi-
lar changes to the ADEA or ADA.71
In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, the Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs proceeding under the ADEA must prove that age was the
“but for” cause of the alleged employment action.72 The Gross decision
fractured the factual causation inquiry in discrimination cases, re-
quiring the plaintiff to prove a stronger causal link in age cases than
in cases under Title VII.
The fracturing continued in University of Texas Southwestern Med-
ical Center v. Nassar.73 In Nassar, the Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff in a Title VII retaliation case must establish that her pro-
tected activity was a “but for” cause of the contested employment deci-
sion.74 Nassar and Gross require the plaintiff to bear the burden of
persuasion regarding causation. They also require the plaintiff to
meet a certain substantive standard: “but for” cause.
Thus, a plaintiff has a different substantive burden in Title VII
discrimination cases (motivating factor) than she has in Title VII re-
taliation cases and ADEA cases (“but for” cause). The Supreme Court
has also resolved the causal standard in other discrimination con-
texts.75 Importantly, throughout this decades-long discussion about
causation, the Supreme Court never invoked the separate idea of
proximate cause.76
IV. PROXIMATE CAUSE AND STAUB
Although the Supreme Court explored the role of causation in em-
ployment discrimination law for decades, it did not invoke the idea of
proximate cause.77 In Staub v. Proctor Hospital, the Supreme Court
imported the concept of proximate cause into discrimination jurispru-
71. Struve, supra note 61, at 288.
72. 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
73. 570 U.S. 338 (2013); see Smith v. Bd. of Supervisors of S. Univ., 656 F. App’x 30,
33 (5th Cir. 2016).
74. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 362.
75. Comcast v. Nat’l Ass’n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020)
(plaintiff must establish “but for” cause to prevail on Section 1981 claim); Babb v.
Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020) (plaintiff not required to establish “but for” cause
to prove liability under federal sector age discrimination provision).
76. Any references to proximate cause have been sporadic and not central to the deci-
sions. In many cases, it appears members of the Court are using the term “proxi-
mate cause” as a synonym for factual cause. See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel.
Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 626 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). In the Price
Waterhouse dissent, Justice Kennedy briefly noted that a statute might require
proof of proximate cause in addition to “but for” cause but does not otherwise
explore the idea. Id. at 282 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
77. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 626 (using term “proximate cause” but appearing to
refer to factual cause).
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dence.78 Revisiting Staub in detail, and with special attention to the
proximate cause discussion, is important because it highlights some of
the problems that plague the appellate and district courts’ current
proximate cause analysis.
The opinion is a mess from a torts perspective. Two ideas are espe-
cially salient. First, while the opinion uses many tort-like words, it
never clarifies what any of those words mean. Instead, the opinion
mixes together concepts of causation, agency, intent, and animus. This
occurred because the Court focused on connecting the animus of indi-
vidual actors to an outcome, rather than focusing on the statutory lan-
guage that connects the protected trait to an outcome. Second, the
Court discussed both factual cause and proximate cause, often without
distinguishing the two concepts. At times, the Court appears to be us-
ing the words “proximate cause” to discuss factual cause.
A. Staub Generally
In Staub, the Court considered whether cat’s paw cases are cogni-
zable under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act (USERRA).79 A cat’s paw case is one in which a biased
individual takes an action against another person based on a pro-
tected trait, but an unbiased individual ultimately makes the chal-
lenged employment decision. For example, a biased supervisor could
place a bad evaluation in an employee’s file, and a second supervisor
(not knowing about the bias of the first supervisor) would then decide
to terminate the employee in a reduction in force based on the bad
evaluation.
Although Staub is a USERRA case, courts have applied it to other
discrimination statutes, such as Title VII. The USERRA prohibits an
employer from terminating an individual if the individual’s military
service is a motivating factor in the decision.80
In Staub, the plaintiff Vincent Staub alleged that two supervisors
were hostile to his military obligations and reported him to human
resources claiming he violated hospital rules.81 There were factual
disputes about whether the hospital had these rules and whether
Staub violated the rules if they existed. The vice president of human
78. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 419 (2011); see also Charles A. Sullivan,
Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431, 1455–56 (2012)
(noting how the Supreme Court avoided and even rejected placing the proximate
cause doctrine into Title VII discrimination cases prior to Staub). The proximate
cause language in Staub is arguably dicta because the case’s core issue relates to
factual cause. However, as discussed throughout this Article, federal courts have
used the concept of proximate cause post-Staub.
79. Staub, 562 U.S. at 416.
80. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a), (c) (2018).
81. Staub, 562 U.S. at 414–15.
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resources ultimately made the decision to terminate Staub based on
the rule violations.82
Ultimately, the Staub Court approved the use of a cat’s paw the-
ory, at least in a limited set of circumstances. The Court held that “if a
supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is
intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action,
and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment ac-
tion, then the employer is liable under USERRA.”83
The Court then discussed how this holding would affect the out-
come in two situations: (1) when the decisionmaker exercised indepen-
dent judgment, and (2) when the employer investigated the employee’s
alleged wrongdoing. First, the Court noted that the independent judg-
ment of a decisionmaker does not break the causal chain. The Court
purported to address this problem through proximate cause jurispru-
dence stating:
And it is axiomatic under tort law that the exercise of judgment by the deci-
sionmaker does not prevent the earlier agent’s action (and hence the earlier
agent’s discriminatory animus) from being the proximate cause of the harm.
Proximate cause requires only “some direct relation between the injury as-
serted and the injurious conduct alleged,” and excludes only those “link[s] that
[are] too remote, purely contingent, or indirect.” We do not think that the ulti-
mate decisionmaker’s exercise of judgment automatically renders the link to
the supervisor’s bias “remote” or “purely contingent.”84
The Court acknowledged that the decisionmaker’s judgment is also a
proximate cause of the decision but noted that the common law allows
for multiple proximate causes.85 The Court also indicated that the ul-
timate decisionmaker’s judgment is not a superseding cause because a
cause is only superseding if it is a “cause of independent origin that
was not foreseeable.”86
Additionally, the Court rejected the idea that independent judg-
ment breaks the causal chain for practical and fairness reasons:
Proctor’s view would have the improbable consequence that if an employer
isolates a personnel official from an employee’s supervisors, vests the decision
to take adverse employment actions in that official, and asks that official to
review the employee’s personnel file before taking the adverse action, then the
employer will be effectively shielded from discriminatory acts and recommen-
dations of supervisors that were designed and intended to produce the adverse
action. That seems to us an implausible meaning of the text, and one that is
not compelled by its words.87
82. Id.
83. Id. at 422 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
84. Id. at 419 (citation omitted) (quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559
U.S. 1, 9 (2010)).
85. Id. at 420.
86. Id. (quoting Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996)).
87. Id.
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Next, the Court discussed what should occur when the employer
investigates the employee’s alleged misconduct. The Court held that
the mere fact that an investigation occurred did not relieve the em-
ployer of liability.88 Instead, the “employer is at fault because one of
its agents committed an action based on discriminatory animus that
was intended to cause, and did in fact cause, an adverse employment
decision.”89 “Since a supervisor is an agent of the employer, when he
causes an adverse employment action the employer causes it; and
when discrimination is a motivating factor in his doing so, it is a ‘moti-
vating factor in the employer’s action,’ precisely as the text
requires.”90
However, the Court left room for an investigation to break the
causal chain in very limited circumstances. It held that the employer’s
investigation must be “unrelated” to the supervisor’s original biased
action.91 The Court also noted that under USERRA, the defendant
would be required to prove the causal break.92 The biased report re-
mains a factor in the outcome “if the independent investigation takes
it into account without determining that the adverse action was, apart
from the supervisor’s recommendation, entirely justified.”93
Turning to the details of the Staub case, the Court held that the
facts presented could meet the new cat’s paw standard.94 However,
because the jury was not instructed with this standard, the Court re-
manded the case to the Seventh Circuit to determine whether the
jury’s verdict in favor of Staub should be reinstated or whether a new
trial should be granted.95
B. Proximate Cause Problems in Staub
Staub sowed the seeds of chaos present in today’s employment dis-
crimination proximate cause jurisprudence. This section explores two
issues. First, it is not clear what the Court meant when it used the
term “proximate cause.” It could be using the term proximate cause as
a general way of stating causation. It could be using the term proxi-
mate cause to mean both factual and proximate cause. It could be us-
ing the term proximate cause to mean factual cause alone. It also
could be using the term proximate cause to mean legal cause. Any of
these meanings could plausibly be extracted from the opinion. Second,






94. Id. at 422–23.
95. Id.
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the Court’s use of proximate cause is hopelessly entangled with other
ideas, such as intent, animus, factual cause, and agency.
In Staub, the Court ultimately held: “[I]f a supervisor performs an
act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervi-
sor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proxi-
mate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is
liable under USERRA.”96 With this sentence, the Court imported
proximate cause into cat’s paw analysis and potentially into employ-
ment discrimination more broadly.
Staub makes the most sense if one actually ignores tort law and
the very specific wording in the holding. Instead, imagine that Staub
is using the term proximate cause to refer to causation in a general,
non-legally specific way. Under this reading, Staub is a directional
signal from the Court—in cases with facts like this one, the plaintiff
might be able to establish causation. Read this way, Staub tells lower
courts that if a supervisor provides biased information that is con-
nected to a negative outcome, the plaintiff can prevail under that set
of facts.
This reading is most consistent with the text of USERRA and em-
ployment discrimination statutes like Title VII, the ADEA, and the
ADA. The text of the USERRA and the other federal discrimination
statutes does not require that any particular person be motivated by a
protected trait. Instead, the statutes’ language connects three con-
cepts: (1) a person’s protected trait (e.g., military service in USERRA),
(2) a causal standard (e.g., motivating factor in USERRA), and (3) cer-
tain prohibited outcomes. In these statutes, there are no requirements
that any particular person act with intent or animus. Although intent
or animus can be evidence of causation, they are not required ele-
ments of USERRA or the other federal discrimination statutes. This
reading of Staub harkens back to an earlier time when the Supreme
Court was less concerned with the role that tort law should play in
discrimination jurisprudence.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to read Staub without infusing it with
tort meaning. The Court’s analysis began with the statement: “[W]e
start from the premise that when Congress creates a federal tort it
adopts the background of general tort law.”97 The Court then appears
to apply a tort law overlay to USERRA. Taking this language seri-
ously means investigating in what tort sense the Court is using the
term “proximate cause.” Unfortunately, pursuing a tort identity does
not lead to concrete answers.
96. Id. at 422 (footnotes omitted).
97. Id. at 417; see also Sperino, The Tort Label, supra note 10 (discussing the ways a
tort framework in discrimination cases is problematic); Sperino, Discrimination
Statutes, supra note 10 (noting how the Staub Court did not discuss whether Con-
gress used the common law as a background for USERRA).
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At times, it appears that the Court is using the term proximate
cause to mean factual cause or some combination of factual and legal
cause. At the beginning of the opinion, the Court framed the case as a
case about factual cause. It stated that it was construing the “motivat-
ing factor” language in USERRA.98 When the Court in Price
Waterhouse explored the factual cause standard for Title VII cases, it
did so through the motivating factor concept.99 Later, when the Su-
preme Court changed the factual cause standard for Title VII retalia-
tion cases and ADEA cases, it contrasted the motivating factor
language in the 1991 amendments to Title VII with “but for” cause.100
Discussing the “motivating factor” language in a discrimination
statute necessarily implicates factual cause. The Court framed Staub
through the concept of motivating factor and never explicitly changed
the framing or noted that it was transitioning from factual cause to
proximate cause. Additionally, the Court cited the “motivating factor”
language of Title VII, drawing a parallel between the two statutes.101
When the Court applied its holding to the facts of the case, it appeared
to engage in a factual cause analysis by noting that the supervisors’
biased input caused the hospital to fire Staub.102
However, other parts of the opinion make it difficult to read Staub
as purely a factual cause case. Even though the case is framed as a
case about the “motivating factor” language, the Court never appears
to address the factual cause debate that a reader would expect given
the Court’s history of cases grappling with the motivating factor stan-
dard versus the “but for” standard. Although USERRA clearly uses
the “motivating factor” language, a reader would expect a factual
cause case to distinguish the two causal standards, at least in a foot-
note or through citations. And, as discussed below, the Court does not
focus its analysis solely, or even primarily, on factual cause concerns.
Instead, the outcome is a mix of concerns about causation, agency, in-
tent, and animus.
This mix of concerns lends credibility to reading Staub as a case
that uses the term proximate cause to refer to a combined concept of
factual cause plus traditional proximate cause. Under this version of
proximate cause, a reader might expect the Court to first analyze fac-
tual cause and then to analyze proximate cause. Taking a holistic view
of the opinion leads to this outcome. When the Court applied its new
98. Staub, 562 U.S. at 417.
99. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244–45 (1989).
100. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013); Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
101. Staub, 562 U.S. at 417.
102. Id. at 423.
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holding to the facts of the particular case, it analyzed whether the su-
pervisors’ biased input caused the outcome.103 This is factual cause.
The Court then considered the effects, if any, of the ultimate deci-
sionmaker’s exercise of independent judgment or of an independent
investigation. The Court appears to frame this part of the inquiry as
relating to traditional proximate cause.104
Staub can also be read as using proximate cause as a separate,
stand-alone concept. The Court indicated: “As we have already ac-
knowledged, the requirement that the biased supervisor’s action be a
causal factor of the ultimate employment action incorporates the
traditional tort-law concept of proximate cause.”105 This sentence sug-
gests that proximate cause is a separate concept within the broader
umbrella of causation generally.
There are multiple paragraphs in Staub that refer to proximate
cause in the traditional tort sense of that term. The Court discussed
why the decisionmaker’s exercise of judgment does not cut off liabil-
ity.106 In doing so, it invoked two concepts from proximate cause. The
first is whether the decisionmaker’s judgment rendered the discrimi-
natory actor’s input as too far removed from the outcome.107 The
Court cited Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, which discussed
proximate cause as a concept separate from “but for” cause.108 Relat-
edly, the Court considered whether the supervisor’s judgment was a
superseding cause.109
The causation portion of Staub is heavily clouded by other con-
cepts. Causation, animus, intent, and agency all mix together. The
Court interspersed these topics throughout the opinion without ever
clearly indicating which of the concepts drove the outcome in the
case.110
In fact, the case contains a very confusing paragraph about agency.
In this paragraph, the Court contrasted two possible agency rules.
Under one possible agency rule, an employer cannot be liable when
the intent of one agent and the action of another combine.111 The
Court supported this rule by citing to the Restatement of Agency and
several cases.112 Strangely, none of the cited materials stand for the
103. Id.
104. Id. at 419–20.
105. Id. at 420.
106. Id. at 419–20.
107. Id. at 419.
108. Id. (citing Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010)).
109. Id. at 420.
110. Id. at 417 (discussing intent).
111. Id. at 418.
112. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Agency section cited by the Court covers situa-
tions where an agent has a duty to reveal certain knowledge the agent possesses.
The cases cited by the Court include United States v. Science Applications Inter-
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proposition indicated by the Court. The other possible agency rule al-
lowed the intent of one employee to be combined with the action of
another.113
After introducing the agency concept, the Staub Court appeared to
immediately abandon any resort to common law agency principles.
What is less clear is whether the Court abandoned agency ideas alto-
gether or whether it read USERRA’s motivating factor language as
relating to agency. The Court noted:
Ultimately, we think it unnecessary in this case to decide what the back-
ground rule of agency law may be, since the former line of authority is sug-
gested by the governing text, which requires that discrimination be “a
motivating factor” in the adverse action. When a decision to fire is made with
no unlawful animus on the part of the firing agent, but partly on the basis of a
report prompted (unbeknownst to that agent) by discrimination, discrimina-
tion might perhaps be called a “factor” or a “causal factor” in the decision; but
it seems to us a considerable stretch to call it “a motivating factor.”114
This paragraph is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it
appears to define the words “motivating factor” as relating to agency,
intent, and causation. It is unlikely that Congress would have used
“motivating factor” to refer to all three of these concepts.
Second, the paragraph reads federal discrimination law as requir-
ing a plaintiff to prove animus or intent, rather than causation. It also
seems to define the term “motivating factor” as what “motivated” the
final decisionmaker. Instead, the federal discrimination statutes re-
quire the protected trait to motivate the outcome, not a particular per-
son. This paragraph seems to take a factual cause standard
(motivating factor) and convert it into an amorphous intent or animus
requirement.
A protected trait can be the factual cause (motivating factor) of an
employment outcome even when the final decisionmaker is not aware
of how the protected trait affected the outcome. Here is an example.
Imagine a male manager who believes that people of Race A are more
likely to steal than people of Race B. He falsely reports to his boss that
a person of Race A stole company property. The boss fires the em-
ployee. In this scenario, it is easy to understand how the employee’s
race was a motivating factor in the outcome. Had the employee been a
national Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1273–76 (D.C. Cir. 2010), Chaney v. Dreyfus Ser-
vice Corp., 595 F.3d 219, 241 (5th Cir. 2010), and United States v. Philip Morris
USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2009). These cases relate to whether a
scienter requirement can be met by showing collective intent when no single ac-
tor within a company possesses the required intent. By contrast, in Staub, the
Court indicated that two supervisors were acting because of military animus. Ad-
ditionally, the cited cases allowed for corporate liability when the company delib-
erately avoided knowing the truth or when its actions constituted gross
negligence. See, e.g., Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d at 1273–76.
113. Staub, 562 U.S. at 418.
114. Id. at 418–19.
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member of Race B, it is unlikely he would have been fired. This is true
even if the employee’s race is not visibly motivating the upper man-
agement decision. To prove factual cause, the discrimination statutes
do not require a plaintiff to piece together the animus of one person
and show how that animus impacted other people in the decision-mak-
ing chain as long as the protected trait played the required causal
role.115 In Staub, however, the Court combines concepts of intent, ani-
mus, agency, and causation.
The uncertainty present in Staub is evident in the appellate and
trial court opinions that follow it. These opinions use the words “proxi-
mate cause” to mean causation in a general sense, factual cause, legal
cause, and both factual and legal cause. The lower court opinions also
intermingle intent, animus, and agency into proximate cause.
V. THE CURRENT PROXIMATE CAUSE MUDDLE
Even though the Supreme Court decided Staub almost a decade
ago, the federal district and appellate courts have not settled on a
fixed way of using the concept of proximate cause in employment dis-
crimination. Several main paths have emerged. Some courts appear to
use the term “proximate cause” as a generic way to describe the con-
cept of cause without any particular legal meaning. Some courts use
the term to mean factual cause. Still others use the term to denote a
separate concept of proximate cause. At times, it is difficult to deter-
mine which version of proximate cause a court is using.116 And even
within these categories, some courts view proximate cause as being
bound with questions of agency and vicarious liability.
Importantly, this muddle remains confined to cat’s paw cases.
Outside of cat’s paw scenarios, very few cases over the past decade
import the concept of proximate cause into discrimination cases.117
115. Staub also gets off track because it expresses concern about combining the intent
of one actor with an outcome reached by another actor. This concern might be
valid if the plaintiff was trying to hold an individual actor liable for discrimina-
tion. However, in federal discrimination law, the employer is the liable entity, not
the individual actors. Id. at 422 & n.4. The Court cited the Restatement (Second)
of Agency, but it is unclear how the section cited even applies to discrimination
law or supports the proposition for which the Court cited it. Id. at 418 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 275, illus. 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1958)).
116. See, e.g., Duncan v. Alabama, 734 F. App’x 637, 641 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that
the plaintiff cannot establish either proximate cause or “but for” cause); Lawson
v. Graphic Packaging Int’l, Inc., 549 F. App’x 253, 258 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing
a jury instruction that substituted determinative factor for proximate cause).
117. A few courts have used proximate cause to determine if a plaintiff’s damages are
closely connected enough with discrimination; however, even these cases are
fairly rare. See, e.g., Morgan v. Chao, No. CV-16-04036-PHX-DLR, 2017 WL
3215647, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 28, 2017), aff’d, 773 F. App’x 419 (9th Cir. 2019);
Rice v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 13-CV-4915-FB-RML, 2015 WL 6965172, at
*2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2015) (discussing concept in the context of remedies and
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A. Generic Cause
Many courts appear to use the words “proximate cause” as a ge-
neric causal concept without any specific legal meaning.118 Indeed,
courts often focus on replicating the outcome they think the Supreme
Court would reach based on the reasoning of Staub, with very little
attention to the term “proximate cause.”
Here is an example of using proximate cause in this way. In Steele
v. Mattis, the D.C. Circuit considered whether to affirm a district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of an employer.119 The
plaintiff, a professor, alleged that his employer terminated him be-
cause of his age.120 He presented evidence that one of his supervisors
made comments that older professors were stubborn and hard to work
with.121 He also presented evidence that this supervisor was involved
in the discussions about whether to fire him.122
The D.C. Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment.123 It
cited the holding in Staub and noted that the “actions of a discrimina-
tory supervisor that feed into and causally influence the deci-
sionmaker’s ultimate determination may also be the proximate cause
of an adverse employment action.”124 The court did not otherwise de-
scribe proximate cause or lean heavily on the concept in reaching the
outcome. Relying primarily on the summary judgment standard, the
court held there was a question of fact about whether the plaintiff’s
age played a causal role in his termination.125
Another example of using proximate cause as a general, non-spe-
cific causal standard is found in the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Alviar v.
Macy’s, Inc.126 The panel recited that to survive summary judgment,
the plaintiff must present evidence that a protected trait was a “proxi-
mate cause—a motivating factor” of the contested employment ac-
noting that there is little guidance about how to apply proximate cause in dis-
crimination cases); Crump v. Tcoombs & Assocs., LLC, No. 2:13-CV-707, 2015 WL
12806526, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2015) (discussing proximate cause in the con-
text of damages); Monette v. Cty. of Nassau, No. 11-CV-539 JFB AKT, 2015 WL
1469982, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015). Some courts have incorporated proxi-
mate cause into retaliation cases. See, e.g., Mutter v. Bragg, No. 1:16 CV 309,
2017 WL 9515322, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 8, 2017) (invoking term as element of
retaliation claim).
118. See, e.g., Velázquez-Pérez v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 753 F.3d 265,
271 (1st Cir. 2014); Lovern v. Jackson, No. CV 08-0082, 2015 WL 494069, at *9
(D.V.I. Feb. 3, 2015).
119. Steele v. Mattis, 899 F.3d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
120. Id. at 946.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 951.
123. Id. at 952.
124. Id. at 950.
125. Id. at 951–52.
126. Alviar v. Macy’s, Inc., 784 F. App’x 213, 220 (5th Cir. 2019).
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tion.127 However, the court did not significantly discuss the meaning
of these words and largely reached its result by analogizing to other
cases and relying on the procedural posture of the case.128
B. Proximate Cause Is Factual Cause
In many cases, judges appear to be equating proximate cause with
factual cause.129 Courts often conflate the two concepts when applying
cat’s paw doctrine in age discrimination cases.130
Two appellate court cases illustrate this way of framing proximate
cause. The Tenth Circuit considered how and whether to apply Staub
in the context of an ADEA discrimination case in Simmons v. Sykes
Enterprises, Inc.131 The court held that the plaintiff could try to prove
her case under a cat’s paw theory, which it called the subordinate bias
doctrine.132 However, the Tenth Circuit noted: “If we were to apply
Staub directly to an age-discrimination case, the plaintiff would then
only need to prove her supervisor’s animus was somehow related to
the termination and not that the animus was necessary to bring about
the termination.”133 The court went on to hold that a plaintiff must
prove “but for” cause to prevail in an ADEA discrimination case and
then purported to define “but for” cause as requiring that the
“subordinate’s animus . . . was the factor that made a difference.”134
The Tenth Circuit then provided examples of when “but for” cause
could and could not be established. It indicated that the plaintiff could
127. Id. at 219. It is unclear whether the court is confusing proximate cause with fac-
tual cause.
128. Id. at 219–21.
129. See, e.g., Wojtanek v. Dist. No. 8, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
435 F. App’x 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2011); Moore v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 5:18-CV-
00485-HNJ, 2020 WL 230978, at *18 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 15, 2020); McLean v. Delha-
ize Am. Distribution, LLC, No. 2:18-CV-00152-GZS, 2019 WL 4046546, at *5 (D.
Me. Aug. 27, 2019); Tuttle v. Baptist Health Med. Grp., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 3d 622,
634 (E.D. Ky. 2019); Heard v. City of Union City, No. 1:15-CV-2228-MHC, 2017
WL 4475926, at *6 (N.D. Ga. July 25, 2017); Washington v. City of Nettleton, No.
1:15-CV-124-SA-DAS, 2017 WL 888351, at *6 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 6, 2017); Hark-
ness v. Bauhaus U.S.A., Inc., 86 F. Supp. 3d 544, 559 (N.D. Miss. 2015); Vázquez-
Pagán v. Borges-Rodrı́guez, No. CV 12-1972 MEL, 2014 WL 5148457, at *2
(D.P.R. Oct. 14, 2014) (in section 1983 context); Cole v. Mgmt. & Training Corp.,
No. 4:11CV-118-JHM, 2014 WL 2612561, at *4 (W.D. Ky. June 11, 2014); Herbert
v. Nat’l Amusements, Inc., No. 3:08CV1945 VLB, 2012 WL 201758, at *3 (D.
Conn. Jan. 23, 2012); Dubin v. Bd. of Madison Area Tech. Coll. Dist., No. 10-CV-
035-WMC, 2011 WL 13209629, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 19, 2011); Saviano v. Town
of Westport, No. 3:04-CV-522 RNC, 2011 WL 4561184, at *7 n.17 (D. Conn. Sept.
30, 2011).
130. See, e.g., Wojtanek, 435 F. App’x at 549; Dubin, 2011 WL 13209629, at *4.
131. Simmons v. Sykes Enters., Inc., 647 F.3d 943, 949 (10th Cir. 2011).
132. Id. at 950–51.
133. Id. at 949.
134. Id. at 950.
308 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:285
establish “but for” cause if the “biased supervisor falsely reports the
employee violated the company’s policies, which in turn leads to an
investigation supported by the same supervisor and eventual termina-
tion.”135 The plaintiff might also prevail when the biased supervisor
writes “a series of unfavorable periodic reviews which, when brought
to the attention of the final decision-maker, serve as the basis for dis-
ciplinary action against the employee.”136
However, the court noted that the plaintiff could not prevail under
the following circumstances:
[W]here a violation of company policy was reported through channels indepen-
dent from the biased supervisor, or the undisputed evidence in the record sup-
ports the employer’s assertion that it fired the employee for its own unbiased
reasons that were sufficient in themselves to justify termination, the plain-
tiff’s age may very well have been in play—and could even bear some direct
relationship to the termination if, for instance, the biased supervisor partici-
pated in the investigation or recommended termination—but age was not a
determinative cause of the employer’s final decision.137
The Tenth Circuit did not use any tort language to explain why the
first set of examples might establish liability while the second set of
examples would not.138
In Sims v. MVM, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that his employer vio-
lated the ADEA by firing him because of his age.139 Sims was seventy-
one years old at the time MVM ended his employment as part of a
reduction in force.140 Sims alleged that his immediate supervisor
made a comment that he was “old and slow.”141 The supervisor denied
knowing the plaintiff’s age at the time of the reduction in force.142 The
Eleventh Circuit considered whether a cat’s paw analysis could be ap-
plied to the case. It held that while cat’s paw analysis could be used in
ADEA cases, Staub could not be imported into ADEA cases because





138. Importantly, under traditional “but for” principles, a plaintiff might be able to
establish “but for” causation in the second set of scenarios. For example, even if
one supervisor has reasons that are sufficient on their own for termination, a
plaintiff could still establish discrimination if the facts suggested that the super-
visor would not have taken that action absent the biased input. A “but for” cause
can be “the straw that broke the camel’s back.” Burrage v. United States, 571
U.S. 204, 211 (2014). In Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739
(2020), the Court noted that “but for” cause is a “sweeping” standard that allows
a plaintiff to prevail when there are multiple causes.
139. Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2013).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1331.
142. Id. at 1334.
143. Id. at 1336.
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The Eleventh Circuit noted that the “motivating factor” causal
standard “is simply the traditional tort law standard of proximate
cause,” and that proximate cause requires only “some direct relation
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged, and ex-
cludes only those link[s] that are too remote, purely contingent, or in-
direct.”144 The court went on to hold that in an age discrimination
case, the plaintiff was required to establish that age was the “but for”
cause of the outcome, not just the proximate cause.145 The court noted
that Staub’s proximate cause principle cannot apply in ADEA
cases.146
The Third Circuit has cryptically stated that the proximate cause
analysis in Staub is about factual cause, agency, and vicarious liabil-
ity.147 The court also noted that in an ADEA case, the factual cause
standard requires the plaintiff to establish “but for” cause, but that
the plaintiff can still proceed under a cat’s paw theory.148 The Third
Circuit did not clarify, however, what it meant when it claimed that
proximate cause was really factual cause plus agency plus vicarious
liability.
C. A Separate Concept
Some courts view Staub’s proximate cause doctrine as separate
from factual cause.149 Many of these cases focus on questions of inter-
vening causes.150
As discussed in the prior section, the Tenth Circuit, in Simmons v.
Sykes Enterprises, Inc., articulated proximate cause as a factual cause
concept.151 However, another panel of the Tenth Circuit described
proximate cause completely differently just two years later in Lobato
v. New Mexico Environment Department.152
144. Id. at 1335 (quoting Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 419 (2011)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1336.
147. Marcus v. PQ Corp., 458 F. App’x 207, 212 (3d Cir. 2012); see also McKenna v.
City of Philadelphia, 649 F.3d 171, 180 (3d Cir. 2011) (appearing to apply proxi-
mate cause to jury instructions related to factual cause).
148. Marcus, 458 F. App’x at 212.
149. See, e.g., Jones v. SEPTA, 796 F.3d 323, 330 (3d Cir. 2015); Swann v. Office of the
Architect of the Capitol, 185 F. Supp. 3d 136, 144 (D.D.C. 2016) (noting that the
plaintiff is required to establish not only “but for” cause but also proximate
cause).
150. See, e.g., Breeden v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 646 F.3d 43, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (in
the FMLA retaliation context, the court considered whether there was an unbro-
ken connection and whether there was a new and independent cause of the out-
come); Duncan v. Johnson, 213 F. Supp. 3d 161, 194 (D.D.C. 2016).
151. Simmons v. Sykes Enters., Inc., 647 F.3d 943, 949 (10th Cir. 2011).
152. Lobato v. N.M. Env’t Dep’t, 733 F.3d 1283, 1295 (10th Cir. 2013). Judge
Tymkovich was on both panels.
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In Lobato, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the allegedly biased
individual’s input might have been the “but for” cause of the plaintiff’s
termination.153 However, the Tenth Circuit noted that “but for” cause
is a separate concept from proximate cause.154 The court cited a law
review article that defined proximate cause as “little more than a
swirling maelstrom of policy, practicality, and case-specific fairness
considerations.”155 The court cited a second article by discrimination
scholar Charles Sullivan noting, “The only purpose of adding a proxi-
mate cause requirement is to limit liability short of the full reach of
but-for causation.”156 Ultimately, the court held that because the deci-
sionmaker investigated the facts underlying the original input, proxi-
mate cause principles cut off the employer’s liability.157
The District of Columbia Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have specifi-
cally noted that proximate cause is a doctrine that helps courts an-
swer questions related to superseding cause.158 The Fifth Circuit
examined a case in which the plaintiff presented evidence that the
employer fired him after he complained about a supervisor’s racial
harassment.159 A magistrate judge, sitting as a special master, had
ruled that a supervisor and a co-worker tried to get the plaintiff fired
after he complained about harassment.160 However, the magistrate
judge did not hold the employer liable for the retaliation because the
plaintiff lied during an investigation into whether the plaintiff was
selling DVDs at work and did not fully cooperate with the
investigation.161
The Fifth Circuit considered whether this outcome comported with
Staub’s proximate cause analysis.162 Citing Staub, the Fifth Circuit
held that the magistrate judge’s proximate cause analysis was incor-
rect because the plaintiff’s refusal to participate in the investigation
was foreseeable.163 In other words, the plaintiff’s refusal to participate
in the investigation did not cut off the causal chain started by the re-
taliatory investigation because the plaintiff’s conduct was foreseeable
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1295 n.5.
155. Id. (quoting David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1671, 1680–85 (2007)).
156. Id. (quoting Sullivan, supra note 78, at 1432).
157. Id. at 1298.
158. Fisher v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 847 F.3d 752, 759 (5th Cir. 2017), as revised (Mar.
30, 2017); Morris v. McCarthy, 825 F.3d 658, 672 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also
Wheeler v. City of Columbus, No. 2:16-CV-1159, 2019 WL 3753579, at *10 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 8, 2019) (stating it is a question of fact whether a subsequent investi-
gation cut off liability).
159. Fisher, 847 F.3d at 754.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 756–57.
162. Id. at 758.
163. Id. at 759.
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given the underlying reason for the investigation. The court was con-
cerned that ruling otherwise would incentivize employers to start
sham investigations and then escape liability when employees prop-
erly resisted such investigations.164 Notably, the Fifth Circuit did not
cite to any common law proximate cause sources in its analysis, in-
stead relying on Supreme Court cases.
D. Inconsistent Outcomes
As discussed in the prior sections, the courts cannot agree on
whether proximate cause is a general causal term, factual cause, or a
stand-alone proximate cause doctrine. Not surprisingly, when courts
apply the concept of “proximate cause” in employment discrimination
doctrine, the results are often inconsistent. Cases with very similar
facts often have different outcomes.
Almost ten years after Staub, it is difficult to predict the circum-
stances under which a court will grant summary judgment for an em-
ployer using a proximate cause analysis.165 An example of this
inconsistency involves cases in which an allegedly biased individual
acts and then multiple levels of review follow. In some cases, the
courts hold that the multiple levels of review break the causal chain
between the biased input and the outcome.166 In other very similar
cases, the courts hold that the causal chain is not broken. This split is
especially prominent in tenure cases.
For example, in Singh v. Cordle, the Tenth Circuit considered
whether a plaintiff could prevail on a discrimination claim related to a
university’s decision not to reappoint him.167 The decision involved
multiple layers of review by a dean, the provost, and a separate griev-
ance committee.168 The court recognized that there might be evidence
164. Id. at 759 n.8.
165. Also lingering within the proximate cause issue is a question about which party
bears the burden of proof. Under the USERRA, the Supreme Court held that the
employer bears the burden of proving that its investigation of the plaintiff was
independent of any biased input. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 421
(2011). Some courts have asserted that the plaintiff must establish proximate
cause. E.g., Morris v. Pruitt, 308 F. Supp. 3d 153, 160 (D.D.C. 2018). Some courts
have hinted that the employer would have some responsibility related to disprov-
ing proximate cause. E.g., Wheeler v. City of Columbus, No. 2:16-CV-1159, 2019
WL 3753579, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2019) (noting the employer would need to
establish that firing the plaintiff was “entirely justified” without considering the
recommendation from the allegedly biased individual). The procedural posture of
the case may also affect the required level of proof. City of Philadelphia v. Wells
Fargo & Co., No. CV 17-2203, 2018 WL 424451, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2018)
(discussing proximate cause under Fair Housing Act and noting the level of re-
quired proof at the motion to dismiss stage).
166. See, e.g., Duncan v. Johnson, 213 F. Supp. 3d 161, 194 (D.D.C. 2016).
167. Singh v. Cordle, 936 F.3d 1022, 1038 (10th Cir. 2019).
168. Id. at 1029.
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of bias from the dean but held that the dean’s bias was not the proxi-
mate cause of the outcome because the decisions of the provost and the
grievance committee broke the causal chain.169 The court held this
even though there was evidence that the provost relied on input from
the dean.170
In a similar case, the Sixth Circuit held that multiple layers of re-
view meant the allegedly biased recommendation against tenure by
the department chair was not the proximate cause of a tenure denial,
even considering evidence that subsequent review levels often rubber-
stamped the initial recommendation.171
However, the D.C. Circuit held that a dean’s negative recommen-
dation related to tenure could be the proximate cause of the univer-
sity’s ultimate decision to deny tenure even if the tenure review
process also involved faculty committees, a provost, and a university
president.172 Indeed, there are a number of cases holding that multi-
ple layers of review do not break the causal chain unless the outcome
is completely unrelated to the biased input.173
In other cases, courts have noted that “getting the ball rolling” is
not sufficient to establish liability.174 In these cases, plaintiffs argue
that initial complaints about their work performance would not have
been made if they were not members of a protected class. Therefore,
any negative outcome that results from the initial complaint is dis-
criminatory because the allegedly biased individual “got the ball roll-
ing.” For example, in one case, a plaintiff alleged that an anonymous
letter prompted an investigation into whether she submitted false in-
formation on her resume about her prior work experience and her edu-
cation credentials.175 She asserted that the anonymous letter was
sent in retaliation for her participation in prior lawsuits against her
employer.176 After the investigation, the employer concluded that the
information on the plaintiff’s resume was not correct and fired her.177
169. Id. at 1039.
170. Id.
171. Li v. Jiang, 673 F. App’x 470, 475 (6th Cir. 2016).
172. Mawakana v. Bd. of Trs., 926 F.3d 859, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
173. See, e.g., Morris v. McCarthy, 825 F.3d 658, 672 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Zamora v. City
of Houston, 798 F.3d 326, 334 (5th Cir. 2015).
174. Jones v. SEPTA, 796 F.3d 323, 330–31 (3d Cir. 2015) (getting the ball rolling is
not enough); see also Lamb v. Montgomery Twp., 734 F. App’x 106, 113 (3d Cir.
2018) (same); Terpstra v. Shoprite Supermarket, Inc., No. 17-CV-6840 KMK,
2019 WL 3338267, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2019) (same); Swann v. Office of the
Architect of the Capitol, 185 F. Supp. 3d 136, 144 (D.D.C. 2016) (same).
175. Swann, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 139.
176. Id. at 140. It should be noted that it is difficult to understand the plaintiff’s evi-
dence in this case because the judge never described the evidence offered by the
plaintiff or even described the conduct on which the plaintiff based her retaliation
claim.
177. Id. at 139.
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Although the plaintiff contested the evidence, the court held that the
employer honestly believed the outcome of the investigation.178 While
the court noted that the allegedly retaliatory letter may have been the
“but for” cause of the outcome, it found that the plaintiff failed to es-
tablish proximate cause.179
In other instances, however, courts have allowed the plaintiff to
survive summary judgment with similar evidence.180 Given that the
courts cannot arrive at a consistent way to define proximate cause, it
is not surprising that the outcomes in cases that invoke the doctrine
are inconsistent.
VI. UNPRINCIPLED PROXIMATE CAUSE
While inconsistent cases are worrisome, there is an even greater
cause for concern. Most cat’s paw cases that use proximate cause to
limit employer liability do not rely on either tort law or the discrimi-
nation statutes in their proximate cause analysis. Instead, most of the
cases seem to reflect one of two things: (1) the judge’s own sense about
whether the employer should be liable, or (2) the judge’s attempt to
reconcile the underlying facts with the outcome in Staub or subse-
quent appellate cases to reach the outcome that the judge believes
these courts would reach.
This implicates separation of power concerns. There is a strong ar-
gument that the courts are not actually invoking common law proxi-
mate cause in cat’s paw cases. Instead, they use the language of
proximate cause to justify an outcome without deriving any meaning
from the concept itself.
When courts invoke the concept of “proximate cause,” they have
not clearly defined which version of proximate cause they are using.
Principles are important in proximate cause doctrine because the type
of proximate cause chosen implicates substantive and procedural is-
sues and might be outcome determinative. One version of proximate
cause might lead to a worker winning a case while another might lead
to a verdict for the employer. Procedurally, some versions of proximate
cause rely more heavily on the jury determining the outcome and
others rely on line-drawing by judges. Thus, the type of proximate
178. Id. at 143.
179. Id. at 144.
180. Murphy v. Ctr. for Emergency Med. of W. Pa., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 2d 406, 431
(W.D. Pa. 2013); see also Remus v. Vill. of Dolton, No. 15-CV-5066, 2019 WL
2568528, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2019) (in the hiring context, there would need to
be evidence of a sufficient, independent investigation by the decisionmaker);
Chase v. Frontier Commc’ns Corp., 361 F. Supp. 3d 423, 448 (M.D. Pa. 2019)
(explaining that cat’s paw liability might be established on the basis that alleg-
edly biased individual did not provide full details to decisionmaker when addi-
tional details would have been favorable to the plaintiff and may have prevented
the plaintiff’s termination).
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cause also plays an important role in who gets to decide the outcome of
discrimination cases—judges or juries.
A. Proximate Cause Without a Source
When courts analyze proximate cause in discrimination cases, they
often do not rely on either the common law or the discrimination stat-
utes. Moore v. Delta Airlines, Inc. provides a good example.181 In this
case, Delta Airlines terminated a customer service representative.
The plaintiff alleged that the company discriminated against her be-
cause of her race and also retaliated against her after she complained
about race discrimination, violating 42 U.S.C. § 1981.182 The court
considered whether to grant summary judgment in the employer’s
favor.
The trial court examined two actions taken by the company. The
first was a Final Corrective Action Notice issued by the plaintiff’s su-
pervisor.183 The second was the company’s ultimate decision to termi-
nate the employee.184 The district court held that it could not grant
summary judgment in the employer’s favor on the Final Corrective
Action Notice claim because there was a dispute of material fact about
whether the supervisor issued the notice to retaliate against the
plaintiff.185
Even though the same supervisor recommended that the company
fire the plaintiff, the court held that summary judgment in the em-
ployer’s favor was appropriate on the termination claim.186 The court
held that the plaintiff could not establish proximate cause—which it
equated with “but for” cause—because the decision to terminate the
plaintiff went through several levels of review.187 The court granted
summary judgment even though it called the supervisor’s recommen-
dation to terminate the plaintiff a “necessary” part of the termination
process.188
Although the court cited to Staub and other cases for the applicable
legal standard regarding causation, it never actually analyzed either
“but for” cause or proximate cause. For example, in a “but for” analy-
sis, one would expect the court to engage the counterfactual. In this
case, this means the court would have asked what would have hap-
pened if the supervisor did not recommend the plaintiff be fired and
181. Moore v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 5:18-CV-00485-HNJ, 2020 WL 230978, at *21
(N.D. Ala. Jan. 15, 2020).
182. Id. at *1.
183. Id. at *3, *17.
184. Id. at *18.
185. Id. at *17.
186. Id. at *18–24.
187. Id. at *21.
188. Id.
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did not issue the Final Corrective Action Notice. Given that the court
recognized the supervisor played a necessary role in the termination,
it is difficult to understand how the court could grant summary judg-
ment on behalf of the employer based on a tort law “but for” cause
analysis. Although it is certainly possible that a factfinder may have
determined causation did not exist, it is unclear how the court could
declare this at the summary judgment stage.
Nor did the court engage in any kind of separate proximate cause
analysis. In such an analysis, one would expect the court to invoke one
or more rationales underlying proximate cause and to apply those ra-
tionales to the facts. The court did not invoke any common law proxi-
mate cause concept.
Additionally, the court did not attempt to justify its analysis
through the text or history of the discrimination statutes. It did not
even explain why Staub or other cat’s paw cases justify the outcome.
In another cat’s paw case, the Tenth Circuit held that any alleged
bias was “conclusively filtered out through the layers of independent
consideration that resulted in [the] firing.”189 The court affirmed the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer.190
In discussing proximate cause, the Tenth Circuit cited Staub and
other cases from the Tenth Circuit.191 The court’s proximate cause
analysis did not refer to the common law of proximate cause.
Very few of the proximate cause cat’s paw cases refer to the Re-
statement, state tort law, law review articles about tort law, or any
other tort-specific source. Indeed, most of the cases contain no discus-
sion of tort law, independent of discrimination law. In these cases, it is
fair to say the courts are not explicitly relying on tort principles of
causation to reach the outcomes.
Nor do the courts appear to be relying on the underlying discrimi-
nation statutes when limiting liability through proximate cause. From
a textualist perspective, when the courts interpret Title VII and the
ADEA, they are drawing from the two main operating provisions of
the statutes. Neither of the statutes uses the term “proximate
cause.”192 Congress has used the word proximate cause in other stat-
utes and knows how to explicitly use proximate cause.193
189. Hanson v. Colo. Judicial Dep’t, 564 F. App’x 916, 921 (10th Cir. 2014).
190. Id. at 920.
191. Id.
192. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2018).
193. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (2018) (providing that plaintiffs may recover dam-
ages in excess of cap if a showing of proximate cause is made under certain quali-
fications); H.R. 7041, 68th Cong. § 261(2) (1924) (United States is liable for “any
disease proximately caused” by federal employment); H.R. 5723, 65th Cong.
§ 105(306) (1917) (United States is liable to member of Armed Forces for post-
discharge disability that “proximately result[ed] from [a pre-discharge] injury”);
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Despite this, the Supreme Court in Staub appears to draw proxi-
mate cause from the motivating factor language of USERRA. Under
Title VII and the ADEA, the proximate cause concept presumably de-
rives from the “because of” language.194
It is strange that even though Title VII and the ADEA have existed
for more than fifty years, the courts have not needed or applied a ro-
bust proximate cause doctrine. Finding a new element within statu-
tory causes of action more than fifty years after Congress enacted
them seems to be a stretch. And, if proximate cause is contained
within the “because of” language, it seems strange that courts largely
reach for it in cat’s paw cases. In other words, courts have largely not
needed proximate cause doctrine for half a century and only began to
robustly adopt the concept after giving a subset of discrimination
cases a fancy title. If a concept is truly an element of the underlying
statute, it is strange that in five decades the concept has only been
needed in a special subset of cases.
Unfortunately, in the decade since Staub, most courts that have
invoked proximate cause have not looked at the underlying language
of the discrimination statutes to see if the language discusses concepts
that might be relevant to proximate cause. When deciding whether an
investigation by an employer cuts off liability or whether to trace the
input of an allegedly biased individual through to a decision, courts
have not looked to the text of the discrimination statutes to draw
lines.
If they did, they would find a regime that already limits liability in
many ways. For example, Title VII limits the people it protects and
the entities that are liable for discrimination. Under Title VII, it is
unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or certain labor organi-
zations to engage in certain types of behavior.195 Although the Su-
preme Court has never decided the question, lower courts have largely
rejected individual supervisor or co-worker liability.196 The statutes
generally protect applicants for employment, employees, and former
H.R. 15316, 64th Cong. § 458(1) (1916) (United States not liable to injured em-
ployee whose “intoxication . . . is the proximate cause of the injury”).
194. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(b) to (c). Similar restrictions are provided in the ADEA. 29
U.S.C. § 623(b)–(c). Some joint labor-management committees may also be liable
for discriminatory conduct. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). Within the ADA, the term
“covered entity” is defined to include employment agencies and labor organiza-
tions. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2018). The ADA, whose statutory provisions are
structured differently, prohibits a “covered entity” from discriminating in certain
ways enumerated by the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)–(b) (2018).
196. See, e.g., Creusere v. Bd. of Educ., 88 F. App’x. 813, 822 n.12 (6th Cir. 2003);
Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003).
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employees197 but usually do not protect independent contractors and
volunteers.198
Even within this narrow band of protected relationships, not all
discriminatory conduct is prohibited. Title VII requires that there be
an unlawful employment practice as the statute defines that term.199
The employment discrimination statutes also contain defenses and af-
firmative defenses to liability or damages. For example, under the
bona fide occupation qualification (BFOQ) provision, the employer is
allowed to make employment decisions based on a person’s protected
class in limited instances.200 Title VII also protects certain seniority
systems from statutory reach, even though they arguably perpetuate
past discrimination.201
Federal discrimination law also has other liability-limiting princi-
ples, such as the deadlines for filing suit, court-created limits on em-
ployer liability, and limits on damages. Each of these devices confines
employment discrimination liability within a fairly fixed range. The
federal employment discrimination statutes do not contain normal
statutes of limitations. Rather, plaintiffs must file a Charge of Dis-
crimination with a federal or state agency within a specified time and
then must file the lawsuit within a specified time period.202 If a plain-
tiff does not file the Charge within the required period, the claim is
usually barred.203 The time period for filing the Charge of Discrimina-
tion varies by the type of conduct at issue.204 For discrete discrimina-
tory conduct, such as a termination, plaintiffs must file suit within
180 or 300 days of the discriminatory act.205
197. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 2000e–2(a); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346
(1997) (indicating that Title VII applies to former employees).
198. Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that
independent contractors are not protected by Title VII); Smith v. Berks Cmty.
Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (same for volunteers).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a).
200. Id. § 2000e–2(e).
201. Id. § 2000e–2(h).
202. Id. § 2000e–5(e)(1). The requirements under the ADEA vary slightly but still re-
quire the filing of a charge. See Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter, LLC, No. 1:10CV24-A-D,
2010 WL 5232523, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010) (discussing how Title VII
requires plaintiffs to receive a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission while ADEA does not contain this requirement).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1).
204. Id.; Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002). The period
begins when the plaintiff has notice of the discriminatory action. Del. State Coll.
v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 259 (1980); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1) (providing
limits for compensation cases); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205 (2010)
(describing how limits work in disparate impact cases); Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117
(discussing limits for harassment claims).
205. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1) (outlining 180-day filing period for compensation
cases); Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110 (outlining 300-day filing period for hostile work
environment claim). The potential scope of federal employment discrimination
law also is limited by court-created doctrine that restricts the circumstances
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The purposes of the discrimination statutes also militate against a
robust proximate cause doctrine that limits employer liability. All of
the employment discrimination statutes have the broad, liberal pur-
pose of prohibiting employment discrimination. The Supreme Court
has indicated that Title VII does not tolerate discrimination “subtle or
otherwise.”206 And, the employer is the party best able to minimize
discrimination. It controls the processes it uses to engage in official
decision making, including the decision to have an attenuated chain of
decisionmakers. It controls the training it gives regarding those
processes. It controls whether decisionmakers conduct independent
investigations of the underlying facts and how strenuous those inves-
tigations are. The “bad” actors in a cat’s paw case are typically em-
ployees of the company or those for whom the company would be liable
under an agency or negligence analysis.207 All of the wrongful actions
for which the plaintiff would be suing would be connected to the
workplace.
While the texts and purposes of the discrimination statutes argua-
bly support an inference that proximate cause ideas are not applicable
in employment discrimination cases, the courts have not relied on
them in creating the emerging proximate cause doctrine after Staub.
B. Separation of Powers
If the courts are not drawing proximate cause from either the com-
mon law or the federal discrimination statutes, this implicates serious
separation of powers concerns. Under the Constitution, Congress is
vested with legislative power, and the courts have the power to inter-
pret the laws that Congress creates.208 Separation of powers thus con-
templates a line between construing an existing statutory regime and
creating a statutory regime.209
Importantly, some versions of proximate cause inherently relate to
policy decisions about where liability should end. And all versions of
proximate cause ultimately serve a liability-limiting function because
they further define the scope of prohibited conduct in cases where an
actor has factually caused an outcome or harm. Proximate cause often
under which an employer will be held liable for discriminatory conduct. See, e.g.,
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 791 (1998); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
206. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
207. In Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 422 n.4 (2011), the Court expressed no
view about liability for information provided by co-workers.
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. III, § 1.
209. This sentence is not meant to imply that the Constitution carefully defines where
this line is to be drawn. J.M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Prob-
lem of History, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 928 (1988).
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expresses a normative preference about where the line should be
drawn.
If courts are not relying on tort law or the discrimination statutes
to forge proximate cause doctrine, separation of powers principles
loom large. When interpreting a statute, separation of powers princi-
ples limit the power of the courts. For example, in the statutory proxi-
mate cause context, a court might make the argument that Congress
intended for common law proximate cause principles to be imported
into a statute. Or, it might argue that the statutory language evinces
a proximate cause doctrine. Although more of a stretch, a court might
even argue that both of these statements are accurate, and that the
court is importing a common law concept of proximate cause and then
using the language, history, or policy of the statute to alter proximate
cause in specific ways.
However, something different appears to be happening in many
proximate cause cases involving the discrimination statutes. Courts
appear to invoke the idea of proximate cause to mask the real deci-
sions they are making. In other words, they are not relying on the
common law, the statutes, or some combination of the two to reach
their outcomes. Instead, they appear to be imposing their own liability
limits on the discrimination statutes. Proximate cause is simply a
cover for courts to impose their own ideas about when liability should
occur and when it should not.
This is especially evident in cases involving multiple levels of re-
view or employer investigations. In many of these cases, even if the
person’s protected class played a role in a negative outcome, courts are
holding that an employer should be insulated from liability in some
instances. Thus, courts are deciding which kinds of human resources
practices are sufficient to cut off liability and which are not. Even if
Congress has the power to override such a decision by subsequent ac-
tion,210 using the language of proximate cause as a mask for overt
policymaking by the courts is deeply problematic in a separation of
powers sense.211
Admittedly, statutory interpretation methodologies vary widely in
their goals.212 These methodologies encapsulate broader questions re-
garding the appropriate role of the courts in relation to the legislative
and executive branches. Such questions include whether the courts
210. Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 521
(2009) (discussing separation of powers concerns in the context of congressional
statutory amendments).
211. See Max Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388, 395 (1942) (“No
American court has probably ever declared that it might, if it chose, disregard a
statute.”).
212. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87
MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988) (describing various statutory interpretation techniques).
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should only consider Congress’s expectations as actually expressed in
statutory language, whether they should arrive at intent from other
sources, or whether courts have broader powers to engage in common
law decision making or decision making that relies on the broader
purposes of the underlying statutory regimes.213
When courts interpret statutes, they risk intruding upon the pre-
rogatives of the legislative and executive branches. The emerging
proximate cause analysis provides reasons to be concerned. In con-
ducting this analysis, courts do not appear to be relying on the under-
lying text of the discrimination statutes. Take, as an example, the
Tenth Circuit case discussed earlier in which the court held that any
alleged bias was “conclusively filtered out through the layers of inde-
pendent consideration that resulted in [the] firing.”214 The court af-
firmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
employer.215 In discussing proximate cause, the Tenth Circuit cited to
Staub and to other cases from the Tenth Circuit.216 The court’s proxi-
mate cause analysis did not rely on the text of the discrimination stat-
ute (or its policy or history) and did not rely on the common law of
proximate cause. Instead, the court appears to be applying its own
liability limit.
Given these circumstances, it is appropriate to wonder under what
authority the court is exercising its authority. The court does not ap-
pear to be engaging in statutory interpretation, common law decision-
making, or some principled combination of the two. Even though it is
difficult to agree on a theory of adjudication with regard to statutes,
this does not mean that courts have or should have unbounded power
to make law. If courts engage in statutory interpretation that is not
faithful to any accepted rationale for appropriate judicial choice, then
it is appropriate to question whether these courts are overstepping
their constitutional boundaries. This appears to be happening in many
statutory proximate cause cases.
C. First Principles: Substance and Procedure
Even ignoring separation of power concerns, there are practical
questions left open by the way courts have approached proximate
cause in the employment discrimination context. The federal courts
213. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5–7
(1982) (arguing that so-called judicial activism is actually a function courts per-
form in diminishing the importance of outdated statutes “in the face of the mani-
fest incapacity of legislatures to keep those statutes up to date”); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) (arguing for a more
fluid notion of statutory interpretation); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT:
THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1999).
214. Hanson v. Colo. Judicial Dep’t, 564 F. App’x 916, 921 (10th Cir. 2014).
215. Id. at 921.
216. Id. at 920.
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have not articulated what version of proximate cause they are using.
The type of proximate cause the courts invoke is important both sub-
stantively and procedurally.
As discussed earlier, there are a number of different versions of
proximate cause, some of which might lead to a different answer de-
pending on the underlying facts of the case. In Staub, for example, the
Court described proximate cause as being concerned with whether
there is a “direct relation between the injury asserted and the injuri-
ous conduct alleged,”217 whether the cause is “too remote, purely con-
tingent, or indirect,”218 and whether the cause was of “independent
origin that was not foreseeable.”219 This version of proximate cause
involves two related concepts: directness and superseding cause.
A directness test is one way to articulate proximate cause.220 How-
ever, at common law, the directness test is considered an older way of
thinking about proximate cause, and modern iterations largely aban-
don the directness test.221 If courts frame proximate cause as relating
to directness, they are making a choice about which version of com-
mon law proximate cause to invoke. And, it is a strange choice to pick
an older version of proximate cause to insert into discrimination juris-
prudence. Such a choice at least seems worthy of commentary about
why it is the appropriate version of proximate cause to import.
When courts use directness, they often connect the idea with su-
perseding cause. Any proximate cause test that relies on directness
and superseding cause as the animating principles quickly runs into
interesting problems in the discrimination context. Typically, when
tort law expresses concerns about directness or superseding cause, it
is discussing an action taken by one actor and then a second action
taken by a legally separate actor. Superseding cause questions often
arise when the acts of a third party interrupt the sequence of conduct,
consequence, and injury between the defendant and plaintiff such that
the liability of the defendant is no longer appropriate.222
However, in the federal employment discrimination context, the
employer is the entity that is liable for the discrimination. In almost
all of the cat’s paw cases, the various actors are agents of the em-
217. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 419 (2011) (quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. City
of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010)).
218. Id. (quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010)).
219. Id. at 420 (quoting Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996)).
220. Kelley, supra note 12, at 51–52 (describing how early common law cases used a
directness test for proximate cause).
221. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29 cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 2010) (“[C]onduct need not be close in space or time to
the plaintiff’s harm to be a proximate cause.”). However, some courts still rely on
arguments about directness when discussing proximate cause. See, e.g., CSX
Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 707 (2011) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
222. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 13.
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ployer. Most of the cases involve a co-worker or a supervisor (with al-
leged bias) taking actions against the plaintiff followed by the
employer taking a negative employment action against the plaintiff.
This scenario is fundamentally different than the typical situation in-
volved in superseding cause analysis. The employer as an entity is in
charge of the employment outcomes it allows. It controls the formal
policies and informal norms that its employees use to make employ-
ment decisions. It controls how it handles discrimination complaints
and how it investigates employee misconduct. Superseding cause
questions in this context are fundamentally different than they are in
tort law given the fact that the employer is the entity liable in discrim-
ination cases and that most cases involve conduct by various agents of
that employer.
Superseding cause is also likely not the right legal concept since
the cat’s paw cases involve a second non-culpable act breaking the
chain of causation. In tort law, superseding cause is usually used in
cases where the second event is criminal in nature or tortious, where
the intervening force operates independently of the original action,
and/or where the second act is extraordinary in nature.223 Further, a
cause is not superseding if the action of the original actor created the
same risk of harm that was brought about by the second action.224
Because courts are applying the superseding cause analysis in
such a superficial way, it is difficult to determine what role the tort
concept is playing and which principles are actually driving the analy-
sis. Before the doctrine develops further, it would be fruitful for courts
to explain which subconcepts they are invoking from the broader con-
cept of proximate cause.
These principles can be important in resolving actual cases. Imag-
ine that a court has a menu of choices about which proximate cause
doctrine to invoke in a cat’s paw case. It could focus on directness. It
might also choose a more amorphous, policy-based proximate cause
doctrine that focuses on fairness and whether the employer should be
liable under a particular set of facts. Or, as discussed earlier in this
Article, it could draw from any number of principles, such as whether
there is a foreseeable plaintiff or the scope of risk of the defendant’s
actions.225
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (listing circum-
stances in which second event will be superseding); id. § 442A (noting that the
second act is not superseding if the original actor creates or increases the risk of
harm); id. § 447 (discussing negligence of second actor). The concept of supersed-
ing cause may be of diminishing importance in the Restatement. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 34 cmt. a (discussing how importance of superseding cause is
diminishing in tort cases).
224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442B.
225. The Restatement has started to use the words “scope of liability” to refer to proxi-
mate cause and has also focused the inquiry on the scope of risk. RESTATEMENT
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The court is then presented a case with the following evidence: A
plaintiff alleges that a supervisor generally rated women as less com-
petent than men with no objective evidence to support his ratings. He
placed two performance reviews in the plaintiff’s file. One review
rated her work as “very good, but not exceptional.” The second review
rated her work as “satisfactory.” Two years later, the company makes
decisions about which employees to fire during a reduction in force.
The human resources department decides to fire the plaintiff. The de-
partment claims it did an independent review of each employee, al-
though it started that process by looking at the performance reviews.
A company vice president then reviewed and approved the human re-
sources department’s decision.
If proximate cause analysis comes into play, the outcome of the
case may depend on which version of proximate cause the court adopts
and how it uses the language of proximate cause principles in the dis-
crimination context. If the court is concerned about directness, it can
draw a line from the low (and biased) performance reviews to the com-
pany’s decision to fire the plaintiff. Since all of the actors are agents of
the company, superseding cause should not cut off liability. Addition-
ally, the foreseeable risk created by the lower performance reviews is
that the company might use those reviews to make a negative decision
related to an employee. That is what occurred here.
However, a court-created, policy-based proximate cause doctrine
might lead to a different outcome. Some courts might argue that the
policy of proximate cause is to cut off an employer’s liability in certain
instances. For example, some of the current cat’s paw cases suggest
that an employer can escape liability when it takes certain steps or
when the biased input is removed from the outcome because of multi-
ple layers of review.
As shown in this example, the kind of proximate cause invoked by
the court is substantively important because it can affect the outcome
of cases. However, many of the proximate cause cases do not invoke
any proximate cause principle. Those that do draw on common law
proximate cause ideas do not provide helpful information about which
kind they are invoking or how the choice affects the case. At best,
there are a few sentences reciting basic ideas about directness, super-
seding cause, or foreseeability.
The type of proximate cause a court chooses is also procedurally
important. When proximate cause is about policy, judges often play a
larger role in crafting the appropriate policies and deciding whether
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 29. Using Restatement sections applicable to physical harm
cases may not be appropriate in statutes where the harms are emotional or eco-
nomic in nature. Reference to these sections is only meant to explain the possible
scope of proximate cause.
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liability is limited in a particular case.226 On the other hand, when
proximate cause is about directness, superseding cause, or foreseeabil-
ity, the factfinder is usually the entity that decides the proximate
cause question.227 In these latter cases, the plaintiff’s claim will often
survive the employer’s motion for summary judgment because the
plaintiff’s evidence will be sufficient to raise a question of fact about
the link between the biased input and the outcome. Indeed, courts
that view proximate cause in this way often hold that it is “for a jury
to decide whether the ultimate decisionmaker reached his decision in-
dependently of the subordinate supervisor’s discriminatory act.”228
VII. A PATH FORWARD
A decade of employment discrimination proximate cause doctrine
has the following features: Courts cannot decide whether the term
proximate cause is a general causal term, whether it means factual
cause, or whether it describes a separate concept akin to common law
proximate (legal) cause. The cases invoking proximate cause do not
have consistent results. Very few of the cases discuss common law
proximate cause in any way. The cases that use proximate cause to
limit the employer’s liability do not explain how the common law or
the discrimination statutes lead to this result.
Given this state of affairs, it might make sense to remove proxi-
mate cause doctrine from employment discrimination law.229 When I
started writing this Article, I thought I would advocate for this result.
However, in re-reading all of the proximate cause cases, I realized that
even though most courts are not using proximate cause appropriately,
they are using the proximate cause concept to have a broader discus-
sion about causation and liability under the discrimination statutes.
Staub stands for an important underlying idea: If a protected trait
plays a causal role in an outcome, the employer can be liable for dis-
crimination. It gets to this outcome in a convoluted way by merging
ideas of intent, animus, agency, factual cause, and proximate cause.
On causation issues, many (but not all) courts appear to be reciting
the holding of Staub and trying to reach the same outcome they think
the Supreme Court would have reached. They tend to view proximate
cause as either general causal language or about factual cause. Many
of the appellate and district courts do not appear to be wedded to any
226. See, e.g., Sanem v. Home Ins. Co., 350 N.W.2d 89, 93 (Wis. 1984).
227. See, e.g., Hulbert v. Vogt, 972 So. 2d 1041, 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
228. Ridgell v. Colvin, No. DKC 10-3280, 2013 WL 952253, at *13 (D. Md. Mar. 11,
2013) (citing Clayton v. John H. Stone Oil Distrib., LLC, No. 2:11-CV-2276, 2012
WL 4359293, at *8 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2012)).
229. The author is expressing no opinion about proximate cause in the remedies
context.
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technical version of proximate cause. Viewing Staub as an outcome,
apart from its proximate cause analysis, is helpful.
While some of the language of Staub focused on the idea of proxi-
mate cause, the core of the case actually relates to factual cause. Let’s
return to the facts of Staub as presented by the parties and ignore the
legal language the Court used to frame its holding. Doing so high-
lights how the case is, at its core, about factual cause.
Staub worked as an angiography technologist at a hospital.230 He
was also a member of the Army Reserve. As an Army Reservist, Staub
would miss work for training and deployments, often on the weekends.
After working for the hospital for fourteen years, the hospital termi-
nated his employment. Staub filed suit, arguing that the hospital pro-
vided false reasons for firing him and that the real reason was
animosity toward his military service.
In 2000, Janice Mulally began to prepare work schedules for the
imaging department where Staub worked.231 Staub informed Mulally
of his Army Reserve duties, which required him to attend training one
weekend a month and for two weeks during the summer. Before Mu-
lally took over scheduling, Staub did not work on the weekends; how-
ever, Mulally scheduled Staub for weekend work knowing about his
Reserve duties.232 At times, Mulally would change the schedule when
Staub reminded her about his drill requirements. However, some-
times she would tell Staub’s co-workers that volunteers were needed
to cover his weekend shift. Occasionally, she required Staub to use
vacation days to cover weekend shift time when he was at Reservist
training. She also scheduled him for extra shifts without notice. Mu-
lally called Staub’s military duties “bullshit” and said the extra shifts
were his “way of paying back the department for everyone else having
to bend over backwards to cover [his] schedule for the Reserves.”233
The department head for Staub’s unit was Michael Korenchuk,
who sometimes intervened on the scheduling issues but never finally
resolved them. According to the appellate court, “Korenchuk charac-
terized drill weekends as ‘Army Reserve bullshit’ and ‘a b[u]nch of
smoking and joking and [a] waste of taxpayers[’] money.’”234
A co-worker, Amy Knoerle, reported that Mullaly would roll her
eyes and make sighing noises when Staub would approach her about
his drill obligations.235 A new employee, Leslie Sweborg, joined the
unit. She testified that two weeks into the job she met Mulally and
230. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 647 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d and remanded,
562 U.S. 411 (2011).
231. Id. at 651.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 652.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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another co-worker (Angie Day) for drinks after work. Sweborg testi-
fied that Mulally told her Staub’s “military duty had been a strain on
the[ ] department and she did not like him as an employee”; Mulally
also asked Sweborg “to help her get rid of him.”236 Sweborg refused.
In January of 2004, Staub received a notice that he needed to re-
port for duty as a precursor to an active deployment. Korenchuk be-
came concerned about work coverage because, at that time, Sweborg
and Staub were the only angiography technologists. In late January,
Mulally gave both Sweborg and Staub written warnings for failure to
help another diagnostic unit when requested. Sweborg and Staub both
disputed the facts upon which Mulally relied to issue the warnings,
and Staub also disputed whether the two violated any work rule.237
As part of the warning, Staub was required to report to Korenchuk or
Mulally when he did not have any patients and to remain in the gen-
eral diagnostic area unless Korenchuk or Mulally gave him permis-
sion to go elsewhere.238
According to the facts as stated by the appellate court, Staub’s
problems got worse in April of 2004. The court noted:
On April 2, 2004, Day had a meeting with Korenchuk, Linda Buck (vice-presi-
dent of Human Resources), and R. Garrett McGowan (chief operating officer).
Day was upset with Korenchuk because she complained to him about Staub
and he did nothing in response. Day said she had difficulty working with
Staub, he would “absent himself from the department,” and he tended to be
“abrupt.” After Day left the room, Korenchuk, Buck, and McGowan discussed
what they should do. This wasn’t the first time McGowan had heard about
“availability” problems involving Staub, so he told Korenchuk to work with
Buck to create a plan that would solve the issue. They never found time to do
that—Staub ran into trouble again and was fired three weeks later on April
20.239
On April 20, Sweborg and Staub wanted to go to lunch. They could not
find Korenchuk, so they left a voicemail for him letting him know they
were going to lunch. When they returned 30 minutes later, Korenchuk
demanded to know where they had been. Even though they explained
that they were at lunch and about the voicemail, Korenchuk took
Staub to the Human Resources office where Buck told him he was
fired.
A written report indicated that the hospital fired Staub because he
failed to comply with the conditions of the written warning. Buck
made the decision to fire Staub with Korenchuk’s input. According to
the appellate court, “Without the January 27 write-up, Day’s April 2
complaint, and the event on April 20—all of which involved unavaila-
bility or ‘disappearances’—Buck said she would not have fired
236. Id.
237. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 414 (2011).
238. Staub, 560 F.3d at 653.
239. Id. at 653–54.
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Staub.”240 Buck reviewed his personnel file before making her deci-
sion and based her decision on past issues regarding Staub of which
she was aware. Buck claimed she was not aware of potential animus
related to Staub’s military service. Staub filed an internal grievance to
his termination and raised the issue of potential military animus.
Buck did not investigate this claim and re-affirmed her decision to ter-
minate Staub’s employment.241 A jury heard Staub’s case and
awarded him $57,640.00 in damages.242
The important issue in Staub was whether his military obligations
played a causal role in the hospital’s decision to fire him. This is a
factual cause question. It also happens to be the same question asked
by the text of the federal discrimination statutes. The first operative
provision of both Title VII and the ADEA focuses on whether a pro-
tected trait factually caused an outcome.243 And, the text of the stat-
utes asks this question in a rather unadorned way, without the fancy
legal language of intent, agency, and proximate cause.
Many of the trial courts and appellate courts that are using Staub
are reciting its convoluted legal language, but it is unclear whether
they are using any of it. Instead, many of the courts appear to use
Staub to explore whether a plaintiff can establish factual cause. For
this purpose, large portions of Staub are actually helpful.
Here are a few of the key takeaways from Staub. If a supervisor
expresses a negative opinion about a protected trait, that supervisor
might also try to get a worker with that protected trait in trouble. The
supervisor might report the worker for minor workplace infractions
and possibly even report the worker for conduct that does not violate
any workplace rule or norm. These reports may factually cause the
employer to fire the worker.
It is no great insight to suggest that a supervisor who does not like
certain employees might try to get them fired by making work harder
for them, micromanaging their work, reporting work infractions that
they would not report for other employees, reporting misconduct when
none occurred, or creating new work “rules” that only apply to the
targeted employees. This causal connection can exist even when other
people are involved in the process. It can also exist when the employer
investigates the reported misconduct.
240. Id. at 654.
241. Id. at 655.
242. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., No. 04-1219, 2008 WL 2001935, at *1 (C.D. Ill. May 7,
2008), rev’d in part, 560 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d and remanded, 562 U.S.
411 (2011). The trial in Staub was delayed while the appellate courts considered
issues related to cat’s paw. Joint Appendix at 89a–90a, Staub v. Proctor Hosp.,
562 U.S. 411 (2011) (No. 09-400), 2010 WL 2707600.
243. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2018).
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Nor is it surprising that once the supervisor gets the ball rolling,
that momentum plays a causal role in the ultimate outcome. Every
worker knows that it is better for one’s long-term job prospects to have
a clean disciplinary record and that workplace infractions might have
real consequences. Everyone knows that higher-level supervisors and
human resources departments often rely on the input from supervi-
sors in making decisions. Once these individuals believe a worker is a
problem worker, it is difficult to shake that reputation.
It is also not a profound insight that an employer investigation
does not wash away the causal connection in most cases. For example,
if the supervisor excessively scrutinized the worker or reported infrac-
tions that she would not report for other workers, the protected trait is
factually causing the outcome. This is true even if the employer finds
during a subsequent investigation that the worker engaged in the
conduct.
A simple example is helpful. Imagine two workers, Betty and Dan.
Betty is seventy, and Dan is twenty-five. Betty and Dan are occasion-
ally fifteen minutes late for work. Rita supervises both Betty and Dan.
Rita has said on multiple occasions that people should retire when
they are sixty-five. Rita carefully watches Betty’s desk and writes
down every time Betty is late. She never watches Dan’s desk, and
even when she notices Dan is late, she does not write it down. Rita
reports Betty to human resources and human resources conducts an
investigation. It finds Betty is late, and the employer fires her.
It is clear that the investigation does not necessarily break the
causal chain between Betty’s protected class and her termination.
This is true even if the investigation reveals that Betty was late for
work. If Betty was twenty-five instead of seventy, Rita would not have
excessively scrutinized her absences or reported them. Betty would
still have a job.
The outcome in Staub supports these commonsense ideas about
factual causation, the same ideas that the jury in Staub likely relied
on to reach its result. While these inferences do not seem particularly
insightful to anyone who works, they often get lost as complex doc-
trines cause courts to lose sight of the core question asked by the em-
ployment discrimination statutes in disparate treatment cases: Did
this worker’s protected trait play a role in a negative outcome?
Staub’s technical holding shows how easy it is for courts to embel-
lish fairly straightforward questions with legal bells and whistles.
Fortunately, many of the courts that are applying Staub are reciting
the bells and whistles but not using them for substantive purposes.
Instead, for many courts, Staub stands for the following ideas: (1) a
plaintiff can establish factual cause even when more than one person
is involved in an outcome, (2) a plaintiff can establish factual cause
even when there are multiple layers of review, and (3) a plaintiff can
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establish factual cause even when an employer investigates alleged
workplace misconduct.244
Even though the courts do not consistently apply these lessons
from Staub, many courts are applying them. Strangely, although
Staub introduced the idea of proximate cause into discrimination ju-
risprudence, its greatest impact has been allowing courts to see how a
protected trait is factually causing an outcome. Unfortunately, the
Staub holding comes dressed in the language of intent, agency, and
proximate cause. Courts can benefit by retaining the outcome in Staub
but ignoring its technical language.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is exciting to witness the birth of a new legal doctrine. In Staub,
the Supreme Court introduced the concept of proximate cause into em-
ployment discrimination jurisprudence. Reviewing the early years of
this new doctrine reveals several important insights.
The words “proximate cause” do not yet have a fixed meaning in
discrimination law. Some judges appear to invoke the words “proxi-
mate cause” as a general reference to causation. Other judges appear
to confuse the concept of proximate cause with the separate concept of
factual cause. Still, other cases appear to recognize proximate cause as
a separate element that must be proven in a discrimination case. This
results in inconsistent outcomes in cases.
The emerging doctrine is unmoored from both tort law and the dis-
crimination statutes. It is so unmoored that the holding of Staub
raises serious separation of powers concerns.
Despite its inconsistency and lack of solid legal foundation, the pre-
adolescent doctrine is contributing to discrimination law in important
ways. By ignoring the technical noise of Staub, courts can more fully
interrogate the role of factual cause in discrimination. While courts
should abolish proximate cause, they should retain the core of Staub:
the idea that plaintiffs can establish discrimination when a decision is
improperly tainted by a protected trait.
244. Some sentences within Staub are still problematic. For example, the Supreme
Court noted:
When a decision to fire is made with no unlawful animus on the part of
the firing agent, but partly on the basis of a report prompted (unbe-
knownst to that agent) by discrimination, discrimination might perhaps
be called a “factor” or a “causal factor” in the decision; but it seems to us
a considerable stretch to call it “a motivating factor.”
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 418–19 (2011).
